Fordham Law Review
Volume 77

Issue 5

Article 8

2009

User Innovator Community Norms: At the Bounds Between
Academic and Industry Research
Katherine J. Strandburg

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: At the Bounds Between Academic and
Industry Research, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2237 (2009).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

User Innovator Community Norms: At the Bounds Between Academic and
Industry Research
Cover Page Footnote
Professor of Law, DePaul University; Visiting Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law (Fall
2008). This essay was prepared in part while the author was visiting at New York University School of Law
during 2007–08. I am grateful for research assistance from NYU student Andrew Michaels. I also thank
the other participants in this Symposium, especially Rochelle Dreyfuss, for valuable feedback and
comments on an earlier draft.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol77/iss5/8

USER INNOVATOR COMMUNITY NORMS:
AT THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN ACADEMIC AND
INDUSTRY RESEARCH
KatherineJ. Strandburg*
INTRODUCTION

The legal literature has devoted considerable attention to the tensions
between patenting as a mechanism of technology transfer and the traditional
norms of academic research.' In this essay, I consider norms of sharing
research tools and materials in what has been called Pasteur's Quadrant, in
which basic science and applied research overlap. 2 I employ a user
innovation paradigm, along with a rational choice approach to social norms,
to address the issue. User innovators intend to use, rather than sell, their
They include hobbyists adapting commercial
innovative technology.
firns developing
products for their individual needs as well as commercial
3
equipment or processes for use in their factories.
User innovators often form collaborative communities in which they
share technical advances with one another in a process of "free

* Professor of Law, DePaul University; Visiting Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law (Fall 2008). This essay was prepared in part while the author was visiting at
New York University School of Law during 2007-08. I am grateful for research assistance
from NYU student Andrew Michaels. I also thank the other participants in this Symposium,
especially Rochelle Dreyfuss, for valuable feedback and comments on an earlier draft.
1. 1 will use the term "academic" throughout this essay, in part because much of the
empirical work focuses on academics and industry scientists. For the most part, the
discussion of academic scientists applies equally well to other scientists at nonprofit
institutions.
2. DONALD E. STOKES, PASTEUR'S QUADRANT: BASIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION (1997).
3. See, e.g., ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 3 (2005); Sonali K. Shah,
Open Beyond Software, in OPEN SOURCES 2.0: THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION 339 (Chris

DiBona et al. eds., 2006). In earlier work I argued that, since empirical evidence and
common sense show that user innovation plays a major part in the invention of research
tools, an infringement exemption for research tool use might be appropriate. Katherine J.
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
467, 478 (2008); see also, e.g., Nikolaus Franke & Sonali Shah, How Communities Support
Innovative Activities: An Exploration of Assistance and Sharing Among End-Users, 32 RES.
POL'Y 157, 158 (2003); Christian Lfithje, Cornelius Herstatt & Eric von Hippel, UserInnovators and "Local" Information: The Case of Mountain Biking, 34 RES. POL'Y 951,
953-54 (2005).

2237

2238

revealing" 4-what

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

Robert C. Allen has called "collective invention."'5

Surprisingly, free revealing occurs not only among hobbyists, but also in

commercial contexts among market competitors. 6 Traditional practices of
sharing research tools and materials in the academy also can be viewed as
examples of free revealing in user innovator communities.
The convergence of academic research with commercial interests has two
different types of consequences for sharing norms. 7 First, a research tool or
material developed in a nonprofit research context may be a dual-purpose
innovation with both research and nonresearch uses. Thus, for example, a
genetic assay may be useful in research and as a clinical diagnostic test;
many chemicals are used in the laboratory and in industrial processes; many
imaging techniques have laboratory and commercial applications; and so
forth. Second, the overlap of research interests between nonprofit and

industry scientists means that the user community for research tools and
materials in Pasteur's Quadrant is more diverse than in areas of purely basic
research. Both of these types of overlap affect the robustness of research
tool sharing norms.

4. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3, at 3, 9-10; see also, e.g., Carliss Baldwin, Christoph
Hienerth & Eric von Hippel, How User Innovations Become Commercial Products: A
TheoreticalInvestigation and Case Study, 35 RES. POL'Y 1291 (2006); Emmanuelle Fauchart
& Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual PropertySystems: The Case of French Chefs,
19 ORG. SCI. 187, 193 (2008); Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 159-60; Johann Fuller,
Gregor Jawecki & Hans Miihlbacher, Innovation Creation by Online Basketball
Communities, 60 J. Bus. RES. 60 (2007); Joachim Henkel, Selective Revealing in Open
Innovation Processes: The Case of Embedded Linux, 35 RES. POL'Y 953 (2006); Jacob
Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect Intellectual Property Without Law, in
LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Christine A. Corcos ed., forthcoming 2009),

available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005564; Lilthje et al., supra note 3; Peter B. Meyer,
Episodes of Collective Invention 3 (U.S. Dep't of Lab. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, Working
Paper No. 368, 2003), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=466880; Robert P. Merges, From
Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions,
and Innovation 14 (Nov. 13, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-661543; Andrew J.
Nelson, Institutional Convergence and the Diffusion of University-Versus Firm-Origin
Technologies 158-67 (May 11, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
5. Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1983).
6. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3; Allen, supra note 5; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra
note 4, at 193; Henkel, supra note 4; Meyer, supra note 4, at 5, 13, 21; see also Baldwin et
al., supra note 4; Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 159-60; Filler et al., supra note 4; Luthje
et al., supra note 3; Loshin, supra note 4; Merges, supra note 4, at 14; Nelson, supra note 4,
at 158-67.
7. Elsewhere I have analyzed some of the challenges posed to these traditional sharing
practices in the nonprofit research community by the increasing importance of research
materials and extensive databases, which cannot be shared by the low-cost mechanism of
publication. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Norms and the Sharing of Research
Materials and Tacit Knowledge, in WORKING WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF IP (Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming 2009) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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Recent empirical studies 8 suggest that scholars may have been overly
concerned about the potential erosion of academic sharing norms due to
research tool patenting per se.9 Scientists in both academia and industry
routinely ignore patents on do-it-yourself research tools that can be
"homemade" in the laboratory.' 0 However, while patents per se may not
impede research tool sharing very significantly, research material sharing is
more problematic." Moreover, materials sharing difficulties appear to be
12
greatest at the interface between academic and commercial research.
The social norm analysis presented here predicts that the viability and
robustness of practices of sharing research tools and materials depends on
the differing preferences of academic and industry scientists, on whether a
tool is do-it-yourself or requires access to a specific material, and on
whether the tool is a garden variety research tool or a dual-purpose tool
8. STEPHEN A. HANSEN ET AL., AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY: A
REPORT BY THE PROJECT ON SCIENCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
24 (2007); JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS, MATERIAL
TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 2 (2005)
[hereinafter WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS]; Wesley M. Cohen
& John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, in 8 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2008); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora
& Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 315-16 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool
Patents]; John P. Walsh, Wesley M. Cohen & Charlene Cho, Where Excludability Matters:
Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research, 36 RES. POL'Y
1184 (2007) [hereinafter Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters].
9. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary
Research Tools: Is This Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms
of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Proprietary Rights]; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99 (1998);
F. Scott Kieff, FacilitatingScientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms
of Science-A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691 (2001); Fiona Murray
& Scott Stem, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific
Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis, 63 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 648 (2007); Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual PropertyRights:
A Reply to Kieff, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) [hereinafter Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms];
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms
of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1999) [hereinafter Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research]; Paul A. David, Can 'Open Science' Be Protectedfrom the Evolving Regime of
IPR Protections? (Working Paper) (n.d.), available at http://siepr.stanford.edu/papers/
pdf/02-42.pdf.
10. See, e.g., WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8,
at 15-16, 26-27; Cohen & Walsh, supra note 8, at 12; Walsh et al., Where Excludability
Matters, supra note 8, at 1188-91, 1199.
11. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 19-20,
27-28; Cohen & Walsh, supra note 8, at 15; Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters,
supra note 8, at 1191-94, 1199.
12. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 25;
Walsh et al., Where Excludability Matters, supra note 8, at 1191, 1193-94.
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with a significant nonresearch market. To understand sharing practices,
empirical studies should seek to disentangle these variables. Policy
prescriptions for enhancing sharing also should account for these factors.
Part I of this essay briefly reviews the rational choice theory of social
norms and applies it to the general context of user innovator sharing. It
then describes a "homo scientificus" preference model of scientists 13 and
explains briefly how the traditional Mertonian norm of communalism, 14 as
applied to the sharing of research tools and methods, can be understood as a
response to collective action problems in an academic researcher innovator
community. Part II considers the impact of the two types of convergence
between industry and academic research identified above on the potential
for sharing norms and interprets empirically observed research tool and
materials sharing practices in light of the theory. Part III discusses how
policy initiatives can promote "ignoring patents" and materials sharing
norms. It notes that, at least in some circumstances, sharing norm viability
may depend on preserving boundaries between academic and industry uses
of research tools and discusses the roles that patents and other policy
mechanisms might play in preserving or breaching such barriers. Part IV
concludes by summarizing the analysis and suggesting ways to encourage
research tool and materials sharing.
I. A SOCIAL NORM

THEORY OF SHARING RESEARCH TOOLS AND
MATERIALS

A. Sharing in User Innovator Communities
When scientists develop research tools and materials, they are generally
acting as user innovators since they are motivated to develop the tools for
their own research use. User innovators frequently come together in
innovative communities, sharing and building upon one another's
inventions. 15 While this may not be surprising in the case of some
noncompetitive groups of hobbyists, it is common even among commercial
actors and even when the members of the community are competitive with
6
one another.'
There have been a number of fascinating case studies of "free revealing"
or "collective invention" in what turn out upon reflection to be user
13. Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology
Transfer, in 16 ADVANCES INTHE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH
14.

93, 95 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005).

See

ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL

INVESTIGATIONS (1973); Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 90; Erik Erno-

Kjolhede, Scientific Norms as (Dis)integrators of Scientists? (Copenhagen Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 14/2000, 2000).
15. See Baldwin et al., supra note 4; Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160; Faller et al.,
supra note 4; Lithje et al., supra note 3; Meyer, supra note 4, at 3; supra note 4.
16. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3; Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 193; Henkel,
supra note 4; Loshin, supra note 4; Meyer, supra note 4, at 5, 13, 21.

2009]

USER INNO VA TOR COMMUNITY NORMS

2241

innovator communities whose members develop or improve technology for
their own use. 17 Communities that have been studied in detail include ironmaking companies in the 1850s, 18 Venetian glass-making guilds in the
21
20
1400s, 19 open source software programmers, steel makers in the 1850s,
23
22
the "Mouse Men of America" in biological research, computer clubs,
24
25
and mountain bikers.
The similarities between the
skateboarders,
26
scientific community and these communities are frequently mentioned.
The general picture that emerges from these studies is that user innovators
share their technical advances with other community members in rough
27
exchange for access to technical advances made by the others.
Particularly interesting for present purposes is the fact that many of these
communities consist of user innovators who compete with one another to
some extent, either in the marketplace or in other venues. 28 For example,
commercial competitors are now major contributors to the development of
29
certain commonly used open source software programs, such as Linux.
On the hobbyist end, user communities of athletes, who30often combine
sharing with competition, are among the most well-studied.
Such communities succeed when users benefit from each other's
innovations, as will tend to be the case in a group that is not purely
competitive; that is, members benefit when the community as a whole
advances. Thus, competing user innovators share innovations because there

17. See VON HIPPEL, supra note 3; Baldwin et al., supra note 4; Fauchart & von Hippel,
supra note 4, at 192-94; Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160; Liuthje et al., supra note 3;
Shah, supra note 3; Meyer, supra note 4, at 3.
18. Meyer, supra note 4, at 4-5.
19. Merges, supra note 4, at 14-16.
20. STEVE WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004); Karim Lakhani & Eric von

Hippel, How Open Source Software Works: "Free" User-to-User Assistance?, 32 RES.
POL'Y 923 (2003); Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J.
INDUS. ECON. 197 (2002).

21. Meyer, supra note 4, at 7.
22. Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse that Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a
Source of Productive Tension at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, AM. J. Soc.
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
23. Meyer, supra note 4, at 5-6.
24. Shah, supra note 3, at 347-50.
25. Luthje et al., supra note 3.
26. See, e.g., VON HIPPEL, supra note 3; Jean-Michel Dalle & Paul A. David, The
Allocation of Software Development Resources in Open Source Production Mode, in
PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 297, 324 n.5 (Joseph Feller et al. eds.,

2005).
27. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3.
28. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4; Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160, 170;
Henkel, supra note 4; Loshin, supra note 4; Shah, supra note 3; Meyer, supra note 4, at 5,
13,21.

29. Siobhdn O'Mahony & Fabrizio Ferraro, Managing the Boundary of an 'Open'
Project, in MARKET EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATION (John Padgett & Walter Powell eds.,
forthcoming
2010),
available at
http://www.umass.edu/digitalcenter/events/pdfs/

OMahonyopenjproject.pdf.
30. Baldwin et al., supra note 4; Franke & Shah, supra note 3, at 160; Luthje et al.,
supra note 3; Shah, supra note 3.
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are trade-offs between internal competition between members and the
benefits of sharing. Sharing can be rewarding in several ways: it may be a
prerequisite for access to innovations made by other community members;
it may be a prerequisite for reputational and other rewards offered by the
community; it may lay a user's innovation open to improvement by other
members of the community; or it may simply promote the overall enterprise
of the group. For a variety of reasons-including personal satisfaction in
improved performance, appreciation of improved output of the group's
activity, and competition between the group and "outsiders"-even
competitive users often value the general success of the user community.
So, for example, members of a competitive tennis club might enjoy the
games more if all players improve or have access to better equipment;
scientific researchers might enjoy having more complete scientific
knowledge and better research tools even if they have to share them; and an
entire industry might be in competition with producers of potential
31
substitutes or with other seekers of investment capital.
Rational choice theory describes how informally enforced social norms
can solve collective action problems in close-knit, repeatedly interacting
communities as long as deviations from the norm can be detected and
punished by community members. 32 The theory grounds social norms in
the private preferences of community members and explains cooperative
behavior in terms of rational utility maximization. 33 The norms of interest
to us here are sanction-driven norms, enforced by informal penalties that are
often reputational in nature, but may also involve more 34
direct punishments
such as withholding resources under the group's control.
In a rational choice model, the stability and viability of a sanction-driven
norm depends on three things: (1) the fact that the norm is beneficial for
community members in light of their preferences; (2) the community's
ability to detect defections from the norm; and (3) the community's ability
to impose penalties that are sufficient to deter defection yet not so costly to
35
impose that they overwhelm the coordination benefit.
The sharing propensity of user innovator communities can be
parameterized in a simple model that captures at least some of the most
important tradeoffs involved in a user's decision whether to share an
innovation with a community of similar users. Assume for the moment that
all members of a user innovator community are equivalent in their
31. It is worth noting here that, like social norms more generally, sharing norms that
arise to benefit a particular community need not be optimal for society at large. While this is
generally not an issue in the context of research tool invention, I return to this point briefly
when I discuss the issue of materials transfer across the boundary between academia and
industry.
32. STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS INA WIRED WORLD (2004); Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997).
33. HETCHER, supra note 32; McAdams, supra note 32, at 355-76.

34. See, for example, HETCHER, supra note 32, at 58-59, for a discussion of social
norms as solutions to iterated prisoner's dilemmas.
35. HETCHER, supra note 32; McAdams, supra note 32, at 358.
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production and consumption of innovations and also equally able to benefit
from refusing to share their innovations so that they can use them
exclusively. 36 Assume also that, because these are user innovators, they
innovate for their own use regardless of what they expect others to do.
Often this is a reasonable assumption because innovation is a relatively low
cost endeavor for user innovators, whose innovations derive from
experience gained in the course of pursuing their normal activities. In any
event, I assume here that the choice to innovate is driven by use and hence
exogenous to the decision whether to share. The model analyzes the choice
whether to share a newly developed innovation with others in a user
community.
Let U be the value of nonexclusive use of an innovation developed by
another user. In the context of scientific research, for example, scientists
may gain intrinsic enjoyment from doing research using new tools; they
may derive direct satisfaction from the advancement of the field made
possible by new tools; or they may use a tool nonexclusively to make the
minimal scientific advances necessary to keep them "at par" with other
researchers and involved in the community.
Of course, even if she shares her innovation with other users, the user
who developed a research tool may retain some advantage in using it as a
result of skill, tacit knowledge, tailoring of the innovation to her particular
interests, or similar factors. Let such first mover advantage be denoted M.
The value of using one's own innovation nonexclusively is thus U + M,
while the value of using someone else's innovation is simply U.
Rather than share his or her innovation with others, a user might seek to
use it exclusively. If the members of a community are in competition with
one another, exclusive use of an innovation may provide a competitive
advantage. Define E to be the increase in an innovation's value to its user
developer when she uses it exclusively; the total value to the innovator of
exclusive use of her innovation is thus U + E. In the model, E is the net
additional benefit of exclusive use. It reflects both the costs and the
benefits of exclusivity. In many, if not most, user innovator communities,
E is positive because exclusive use gives a user innovator a leg up in
intragroup competition. The decision to share then reflects a trade-off
between the advantages of sharing and the benefits of exclusive use. For
some innovation, E may even be negative. For example, some innovations
become more valuable when they are shared, perhaps as a result of a need
for standardization or of the need for access to the heterogeneous talents of
the user innovator community to optimize their value. In other cases, the
costs of maintaining exclusivity outweigh the benefits of exclusive use, so
that E is negative.
36. 1 also assume here that sharing an invention means sharing it with the entire group.
In many cases-such as when sharing is accomplished through publication or by
demonstrating or using the invention in a group context or when social processes within the
group ensure that information will spread throughout the group-this is a realistic
assumption. I return to this point when discussing materials sharing below.
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Two additional parameters in the model reflect the costs and benefits of
sharing an innovation with the user community. Let C be the cost of
sharing an innovation (often, for example, by publication). I have more to
say about sharing costs below. Let R be any reward, other than access to
the innovations of other users in the community, that a user receives in
return for sharing an innovation. The reward R might, for example, include
reputational benefits or intrinsic enjoyment of contributing to community
discourse. Finally, assume there are N members of the user community.
A member (whom we will call A) will make a strategic choice of whether
to share her innovation based on what she expects other members to do. In
making that choice in our simplified model, user A will assume that the N1 other users, faced with identical incentives, will make identical choices.
In this symmetric situation, the "payoffs" that user A would expect in light
of how the others might behave will look like this:
Other User Innovators
Share
Don't Share
User
Innovator
A~i

Share
Don't
Share

NU+M+R-C

U+M+R -C

If all community members share (the upper left hand comer above),
member A has access to N- 1 innovations shared by the others. Because
member A shares, her own innovation is worth U + M to her (she gets a first
mover advantage, but no exclusivity advantage) and she receives the
rewards of and incurs the costs of sharing. Her net payoff is thus
NU + M + R - C. If none share (the lower right hand comer), member A is
restricted to using her own innovation exclusively and her payoff is U + E.
If member A shares and the others do not (the upper right hand comer),
member A receives only the benefit of using her own innovation
nonexclusively, U + M, along with the rewards and costs of sharing. If
member A does not share and the others do (lower left hand comer), A
benefits nonexclusively from all the other innovations, (N- 1)U, and
exclusively from her own, U + E. In choosing her course of action, A will
consider her prospective payoffs in light of either course of action by the
rest of the community.
Inspecting the matrix, one can see that sometimes there may be no need
for a sharing norm. If the first mover advantages, M, and other rewards for
sharing bestowed by the community, R, are large enough and sharing is
relatively cheap, the benefits of exclusivity may be outweighed by the
rewards of sharing; that is, M + R - C > E. In this case, A will prefer to
share her innovation, regardless of what the others do. Because all user
innovators are identical in the model, all will share. In this happy situation,
there is no need for a social norm to enforce sharing.
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However, a less felicitous situation may arise. It may be that the rewards
for sharing are not enough to motivate user innovator A (and all her
identical colleagues) to share unless she can be sure that everyone else will
share as well. Thus, if M+ R - C < E, user A will not make an independent
choice to share. Indeed, no one will share and everyone will receive only
the benefit of exclusive use of his or her own innovation, U + E. This is an
unfortunate situation for the user community (indeed, it is a classic
collective action problem) if the benefit to each user of sharing all of the
innovations would have outweighed the advantage of using her own tool
exclusively. Thus, if (N - 1)U+M+R-C>E>M+R-C,all user
innovators would benefit from a means to ensure that everyone in the
community shares. In this situation, a social norm of sharing is desirable.
Such a norm is viable as long as the group can detect failure to share and
impose a sufficient penalty (or equivalently increase the reward for sharing)
at a relatively low cost. Professor Richard McAdams has argued, for
example, that esteem penalties are costless to impose. 37 In any event, as
long as the cost of the penalty is low enough, the group will be willing in
principle to impose it. (I do not deal here with the question of the
mechanism by which such a norm is established.)
To summarize, depending on the values of U, M, R, C, and E, there are
three regimes:
Regime I: M + R - C > E, the benefits of sharing one's own innovation
are enough to induce sharing regardless of what others do; no social norm is
necessary;
Regime II: (N- 1)U+ M+ R - C> E> M+R - C, sharing is preferable
if everyone shares; a social norm is desirable to coordinate sharing;
Regime III: E> (N - 1) + M + R - C, the exclusivity payoff outweighs
the benefits of sharing; user innovators will not share.
The viability of sharing norms thus depends on the preference structure
of the user innovator community under consideration, which determines the
relative values of U and E. Specifically, the extent to which a group of
competitive user innovators benefits by sharing depends upon the trade-off
between the competitive advantages of exclusivity and the advantage to
each group member of the advancement of the group's technology as a
whole. These trade-offs are captured in the simple model by the relative
values of (N- 1) U, and E. In general, the value of one user's innovation to
other users, U, is likely to be relatively high simply because both are
engaged in using the same technology.
In his article, Episodes of Collective Invention, Peter Meyer notes that
shared innovative activity tends to characterize the early phase of
establishment of an industry. 38 This timing makes sense in light of the
simple model examined here: the relative benefits of promoting the
industry as a whole vis-d-vis competing industries tend to dominate the
37. McAdams, supra note 32, at 357-58.
38. Meyer, supra note 4, at 15-17.
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benefits of exclusive use of an innovation in intragroup competition during
such phases.
The viability of a sharing norm also depends on the rewards bestowed for
sharing, and also, importantly, on the costs of sharing, which depend on the
nature of a given innovation. In particular, norms of sharing are more
tenable when the costs of sharing an innovation are relatively low. The cost
of sharing, C, is likely to be low for user innovations. User innovations will
tend to depend on the particular kinds of expertise and information
possessed by users of a technology. 39 Because other users share much of
this expertise and information, they will probably have reasonably high
"absorptive capacity 40 and be able to pick up and use innovations
developed by other users relatively easily. 4 1
Thus, the costs of
disseminating user innovations within a user community will tend to be
relatively small compared to the costs of disseminating innovations in more
traditional consumer situations. Many of the user innovation communities
studied so far have employed publication as a means of sharing their
innovations. 42 Publication is a relatively cheap method of dissemination
and its marginal cost is low. Moreover, it is particularly effective where
absorptive capacity is high.
Sharing will tend to be favored as a user innovator group gets larger
because the pool of shared innovations (and hence (N- 1)U gets larger.
However, in some cases, the costs of sharing or the benefits of exclusivity
may also rise as the number in the group increases, thus tending to decrease
the net desirability of sharing. It will also be more difficult to enforce an
informal sharing norm in a larger group. Informal norms depend on
detecting deviations from the norm and on the ability to impose penalties,
43
which usually are based on repeated interactions and often on reputation.
As a group gets larger, informal norms may become less effective, and it
may or may not be possible for a group to reinforce a norm by imposing
more formal rules.
There are many limitations to the simple model described here, some of
which are important for research tool and material sharing in Pasteur's
Quadrant. The model assumes a homogeneous group, for example, in
which all innovations are of equal value to all participants, and all
participants have the same costs and benefits of sharing and exclusivity. In
reality, some participants will be motivated more than others to defect from
a sharing norm for a variety of reasons, including greater ability to benefit
from exclusivity. Heterogeneity in the quality of innovations is constrained
to some extent in the scientific context by academic requirements such as

39. VON HIPPEL, supra note 3.
40. Id. at 68-70; Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New
Perspectiveon Learningand Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 128 (1990).
41. Strandburg, supra note 3, at 513.
42. Filler et al., supra note 4; Meyer, supra note 4, at 8-11.
43. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
passim (1991); HETCHER, supra note 32; McAdams, supra note 32, at 357-58.
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the Ph.D. degree, "publish or perish" tenure requirements, and peer review.
Nonetheless, there can still be research tool "blockbusters," which will
provide incentives to defect from sharing that outweigh the penalties
imposed by the group. As the number of defectors increases, the benefits of
participation in the sharing group decrease, as does the group's ability to
penalize defectors. Such heterogeneity might in some circumstances set off
a destabilizing cascade that would destroy a sharing norm.44 On the other
hand, qualitative heterogeneity in skills, knowledge, use experiences, and so
forth increases the rewards of sharing because innovations tend to be
complementary and thus tend to stabilize sharing.
The model of a binary choice between sharing and exclusivity is also
highly oversimplified.
User innovator communities often exhibit
complicated norm regimes of sharing and exclusivity, 45 possibly reflecting
the relative costs and benefits of sharing certain types of innovations.
Moreover, it is possible to balance the benefits of exclusivity and sharing by
controlling the timing of sharing, using an invention exclusively for a
period of time before sharing it with the community. 46 This is, in fact, what
47
seems to be the norm in scientific research.
The approximation of rational utility maximization itself is subject to
various sorts of critique, one of the most important of which is that many
individuals appear to be "reciprocators" who are more inclined to cooperate
than might be expected from a utility maximization approach. 4 8 The
Prisoner's Dilemma-type analysis, in which all group members decide once
and for all and simultaneously whether to share, is also highly
oversimplified. Finally, as I discuss in greater detail in the research tool
context, the discussion so far has not accounted for a group's interaction
with outsiders. If the benefits or costs of a group's sharing practices spill
over to outsiders, this can affect both the social desirability and the
robustness of a sharing norm.
Despite these limitations, the model provides useful insights into the
determinants of user innovator community sharing. The next section
applies the insights from this rather abstract treatment to research tool
sharing in the purely academic context 49 as a predicate to the Pasteur's
Quadrant analysis in Part II.

44. See, e.g., Jonathan Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of Property:

Rational

Cooperation in Innovation Markets (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research
Paper No. C08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1287283.
45. Fauchart & von Hippel, supra note 4, at 192-94; Henkel, supra note 4; Loshin,
supra note 4; Meyer, supra note 4, at 4, 17-20.
46. Henkel, supra note 4.

47. Strandburg, supra note 13, at 109-13.
48. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051,
1138-43 (2000).
49. For a more detailed discussion of sharing of research tools and materials among
nonprofit researchers, see Strandburg, supra note 7.

2248

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

B. "Homo Scientificus" and Research Tool Sharing in the Ivory Tower
When a technology is employed in researching the properties of
something else, it functions as a research tool or method (often collectively
denominated "research tools" in the literature). Research tools and methods
more often than not 50 are developed by researchers and thus are user
innovations. The "research tool" category is somewhat ill-defined, since a
technology may often be employed both as a tool for research and in some
other way. A microscope, for example, can be used in research, but can
also be used to read the results of a diagnostic test. Similarly, the common
laboratory chemical acetone can be used in research or to remove nail
polish. A list of "research tools" provided by a National Institutes of Health
report is illustrative, at least in the biotechnology arena: "[T]he term
may ...include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models,
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets,
clones and cloning tools (such as [polymerase chain reaction (PCR)]),
methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and computer
51
software."
Though the eventual goal of this essay is to illuminate the impact of
interactions between academic and industrial science on sharing of research
tools and materials, it is useful to start by considering briefly why a group
of traditional ivory tower scientists might develop sharing norms.
Sociologist Robert Merton 52 identified the norms of the scientific
community as universalism, communalism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism. 53 A norm of sharing research tools and materials is
an example of communalism. In terms of the simple model developed in
Section I.A, the viability of a sharing norm depends on the values of U, C,
R, and E, all of which are determined to a large extent by the preferences of
the members of the community.
Scientists, like other people, vary in their preferences and values. But,
just as a model of human beings as rational wealth maximizers is often
useful in understanding both average and collective behavior, an
approximate model of a typical researcher may be used to understand the
behavior of the scientific community and predict its likely responses to
legal and social changes. Based on empirical evidence discussed in detail
50. William Riggs & Eric von Hippel, Incentives to Innovate and the Sources of
Innovation: The Case of Scientific Instruments, 23 RES. POL'Y 459 (1994).
51. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH WORKING
GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS: PRESENTED TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE DIRECTOR

(1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm

[hereinafter NIH

REPORT].

52. MERTON, supra note 14; Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 89 &

n.65.
53. Professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai have written extensively on the subject
of the potential adverse effects that the Bayh-Dole Act and other attempts to define
commercial and proprietary rights in basic research results might have on traditional
scientific norms. See Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights, supra note 9; Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research, supra note 9, at 115-16.
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elsewhere, 54 I model the academic scientist as an individual with strong
preferences for (1) performing scientific research and participating in the
scientific discourse; (2) exercising autonomy in choosing the topic and
direction of his or
her research; and (3) learning the results of the collective
55
research project.
These preferences suggest that academic scientists will have a high value
of U-ability to benefit from using research tools that are also available to
other scientists. The scientific community is also able to provide relatively
large rewards, R, both reputational and in the form of collaboration and
research funding, to those who share their research tool innovations with
the community. In the absence of patenting, the openness of the academic
context also limits the extent to which a researcher innovator can benefit
from exclusivity. Therefore, E tends to be rather small. When a research
tool invention can be shared by the relatively low-cost mechanism of
publication, C is also small. It is thus highly likely that the academic
research community will find itself in Regime I or II of the model and that a
sharing norm will be desirable.
The scientific community is also well-situated to enforce a sharing norm
in light of the homo scientificus preference structure. Homo scientificus
needs two primary scarce resources to satisfy his or her preferences:
research funding and the attention of other scientists. 56 Because of the
predominance of peer review mechanisms for allocating funding and
publication, the community is well-positioned to enforce norms using its
power to allocate these resources.

54. See Strandburg, supra note 13; Strandburg, supra note 3.
55. Cf J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 315, 335 ("[A]cademic researchers

typically are not driven by the same motivations as their counterparts in industry.... Rather,
the motivations of not-for-profit scientists are predominantly rooted in intellectual curiosity,
the desire to create new knowledge, peer recognition and career advancement, and the
promotion of the public interest." (citing Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights, supra note 9, at
178)). It seems plausible that life scientists in particular are also substantially motivated by a
desire to contribute to society. It is unclear, however, whether university researchers differ
from those who go into industry in this regard. While academic research may be less
"tainted" by commercial concerns, industrial research is more practical and may be more
immediately geared toward contributing to public health. Certainly commercialization of
university research can contribute significantly to the public good and no doubt many
researchers are motivated to assist in the commercialization of their discoveries by public
interested motives. Thus, it is important in general to keep these public-spirited motivations
in mind. The analysis here and in my earlier treatment of this question demonstrates,
however, that there is no need to assume that university researchers are more public-spirited
than commercial researchers to account for the traditional research norms in a rational choice
theory.
56. There are exceptions to this contention, of course: some sufficiently theoretical
work may require no more than pencil and paper, and some individual scientists may work
independent of collaborators and keep up with the progress of others purely by reading
scientific journals. But such scientists are extremely rare. Most scientific work requires
significant funding and most researchers work collaboratively.
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Increased university patenting, particularly in the life sciences, has
inspired fears that sharing norms would break down and research would be
significantly slowed or stymied by the need to obtain preauthorization from
research tool patentees. 57 Recent empirical work suggests that research tool
patents have had much less negative impact on research than might have
been anticipated. 5 8 The relatively minor impact of research tool patents is
not due to any lack of patents on research tools or to widespread patent
licensing. Instead, it appears that patents are simply not being enforced
against research use. 59 There is a norm of ignoring patents for research tool
use, consistent with academic preferences for research tool sharing.
On the other hand, there appear to be more significant difficulties with
sharing of research materials, particularly across the industry-academic
boundary. This is understandable from the social norm model because the
costs of sharing research materials are significantly higher than the costs of
sharing do-it-yourself tools, which can be disseminated by publication
alone. Indeed, for the developer of a research material, sharing costs will
tend to be proportional to the number of members of the scientific
community: in the model, C becomes (N- 1)C. In such cases, the net
exclusivity premium, E, also increases because the costs of maintaining
exclusivity are reduced since scientists can publish and present research
results without sharing a research material.
The range of viability of sharing norms will be reduced in these cases.
Nonetheless, even for research materials, sharing norms are still likely to be
common within a purely ivory tower research community given the extent
to which academic scientists value the use of shared research tools.
Moreover, there are a variety of steps, including most importantly the
establishment of centralized tool distribution mechanisms, that can mitigate
the costs of sharing in these cases and boost the attractiveness of sharing
60
practices.
57. For a review, see Katherine J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent
Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and Future Technical Progress, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

AND INFORMATION WEALTH:

ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE

DIGITAL AGE 107, 112-15 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) [hereinafter Strandburg, Delicate
Balance]. See generally Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protectingthe Public Domain of Science: Has
the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARiz. L. REV. 457 (2004); Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Patentsand the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,

56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024-28 (1989); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9; Janice M.
Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent
Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and
Infringement Liability:
Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004); Janice M. Mueller, No "DilettanteAffair":
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringementfor BiomedicalResearch

Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the
Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,2004 Wis. L. REV. 81.
58. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 37;

Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 331.
59. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 3-4,
37; Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 8, at 324-28.

60. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 7.
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II. SOCIAL NORMS IN PASTEUR'S QUADRANT: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
ACADEMIC/INDUSTRY OVERLAP

Up to this point, I have taken a traditional "ivory tower" view of
academic research. This traditional perspective may well remain roughly
accurate in many fields, where industry funding and interaction remain
minimal and patenting is rare. 61 In some areas, however, including notably,
but certainly not exclusively, the life sciences, increasing overlap between
fundamental research and commercial application has rendered this
framework outmoded. As noted in the Introduction, the growing overlap of
commercial and academic interests in Pasteur's Quadrant raises at least two
issues that may affect the stability of research tool sharing norms. First,
there is the issue of dual-purpose tools. In Pasteur's Quadrant, one person's
research tool may be another's commercial product. 62
Second, the
scientific overlap means that industry scientists are engaged in research
projects similar to those in which university researchers are involved. The
preferences of research tool user innovators are thus heterogeneous in
Pasteur's Quadrant research.

63

61. Magnus Gulbrandsen & Jens-Christian Smeby, Industry Funding and University
Professors' Research Performance, 34 RES. POL'Y 932, 940 (2005) (presenting statistics on
industry funding of research for different academic disciplines).
62. Of course, a research tool can always be a commercial product from the perspective
of a tool supplier. Here I mean to discuss inventions that have alternative commercial uses
in addition to their use in conducting research.
63. Each of these kinds of overlap might affect the viability of norms of sharing research
tools and materials. These effects are distinct from other important effects that interactions
between academic and commercial researchers may have on the direction of research. See,
e.g., Brett Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143 (2009); Strandburg,
supra note 13. The question of research tool sharing between industry and nonprofit
researchers is also mostly distinct from questions about the most effective means of
technology transfer of "embryonic" university inventions to the commercial sector.
Research tools, methods, and materials that are traditionally shared by a purely academic
researcher community will not be "embryonic"-at least from the researcher perspective.
See, e.g., Frischmann, supra. For overviews of research into the relationship between
university patenting and technology transfer, see generally DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY
TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES (2004); Nicola Baldini,
University Patenting and Licensing Activity: A Review of the Literature, 15 RES.
EVALUATION 197 (2006); Paul A. David et al., Is Public R&D a Complement or Substitute

for Private R&D? A Review of the Econometric Evidence, 29 RES. POL'Y 497 (2000);
Bhaven Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World
Before and After Bavh-Dole, 35 RES. POL'Y 772, 772-89 (2006); Jerry Thursby & Marie
Thursby, Knowledge Creation and Diffusion of Public Science with Intellectual Property
Rights, in 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE 199 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008);
Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations: Alternative Approaches
(Nat'l
Bureau
of Econ.
Res.,
Working
Paper,
2007),
available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=976005.
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A. Dual-PurposeInnovations and an "IgnorePatents" Norm
Tools, methods, and materials developed for use in research may have
alternative uses as consumer products. 64 For example, an assay may have
uses both in research and as a clinical test. 65 The availability of a lucrative
commercial market for such dual-purpose research tools changes the
incentives for both academic and industry researcher innovators, and thus,
affects the viability of sharing norms.
The results are somewhat
counterintuitive: because patents can be enforced selectively against
commercial competitors and ignored in the research context, they can play a
role in preserving, and even expanding, a research tool sharing norm for
dual-purpose research tools. This use of patents to delineate research and
commercial uses may explain why a norm of sharing unpatented research
tools would evolve into a norm of ignoring patents for dual-purpose
research tools.
1. Sharing of Do-It-Yourself Dual-Purpose Tools
I begin by discussing do-it-yourself research tools, which can be shared
with other researchers by publication without the need to transfer materials,
extensive datasets, or tacit knowledge. Table I summarizes this analysis.
An overlap of research and commercial uses dramatically changes
incentives for academic researchers to patent their do-it-yourself tool
innovations: rather than providing a limited-time leg up in the research
race, such innovations are potential sources of significant monetary income.
A patent may be used to exclude competing sellers or to collect revenue
from commercial users and may also be helpful in attracting a commercial
partner to assist in bringing a product to market. 66 When, as is often the
case, dual-purpose inventions relate to important health, agricultural, or
other social issues, even a publicly minded inventor (or her institution) may
want patent exclusivity in order to exercise control over the terms under
which an invention is marketed, using a patent to negotiate terms such as a
requirement that some effort be directed to serving the needs of low-income
67
consumers or those in developing countries.
64. See generally NIH REPORT, supra note 51; Strandburg, Delicate Balance, supra note

57, at 146.
65. Arti K. Rai, Genome Patents: A Case Study in PatentingResearch Tools, 77 ACAD.
MED. 1368 (2002).

66. It makes sense to speak of a commercial supplier of a do-it-yourself dual-purpose
research tool because what is do-it-yourself for researchers may not be do-it-yourself for
consumers, either because of issues of absorptive capacity or because of the need for further
development of the innovation for commercial use.
67. Whether the use of a patent on a university invention to protect commercial sales is
beneficial from a public policy perspective depends on to what extent the patent is needed to
motivate commercial firms to invest in commercializing the invention, to what extent patent
exclusivity is used to compensate the university inventor for assisting with
commercialization, and to what extent improvements made to prepare the invention for a
commercial market are themselves patentable. This is, of course, the familiar debate over
the virtues of the Bayh-Dole Act and university patenting in general. One distinguishing
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One might at first anticipate that patenting dual-purpose inventions
would raise the exclusivity premium, E, so much that the traditional
academic sharing norm would be destroyed. However, this need not be the
case. While the profit from exclusive commercial sales may be larger than
the value of sharing within the scientific community, it may not be
necessary to choose between them. It may be possible to share tools and
methodsfor use in research while making exclusive commercial sales. The
benefit from exclusive research use of a dual-purpose invention (as distinct
from exclusive commercial sales) is often no larger than the benefit of
exclusive research use of any garden variety research tool or method. The
rewards and costs of publication as a means of sharing the tool with other
scientists are similarly unaffected by whether the tool also has a commercial
market. 6 8 Thus, if scientists can divorce research use from exploitation as a
commercial product, it may still be possible to preserve a sharing norm for
research use only.
For do-it-yourself tools, this requires a means to make an invention
available to other scientists through publication while maintaining
exclusivity with regard to commercial sales. In this situation, patents,
which require disclosure while maintaining exclusivity, are perfectly suited
to maintaining a research tool commons among scientists while maintaining
exclusive sales. A social norm of enforcing patents only against those who
make commercial use of an innovation, 69 and not against those who use it
as a research tool, is likely to be both viable and desirable to the academic
science community. Such a norm would be relatively easily enforceable
since researchers on the receiving end of patent enforcement attempts can
publicize the attempts, subjecting the enforcers to the usual types of
reputational and other sanctions from the scientific community. Thus, a
norm of sharing without patenting may evolve, for dual-purpose research
tools, into a norm of ignoring research uses of patented inventions.

characteristic of dual-purpose research tools is that such tools are far from "embryonic," at
least as regards their employment in research. Thus, the arguments in favor of patenting
may be relatively weak in this context. In any event, I lay that debate to the side here and
discuss the potential for sharing norms to persist in' the face of patenting of dual-purpose
inventions.
68. The caveat that the need to obtain patent protection may occasion some delay in
publication is appropriate here, however. For discussions of publication delays, see David
Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science: Evidence from a
National Survey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1224 (1997); Eric G. Campbell et al.,
Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 473 (2002); Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent
System Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2004).
69. An example of commercial use of a do-it-yourself invention would be the use of a
patented process in a commercial, nonresearch context. It is also reasonable to discuss
commercial sales of a do-it-yourself research tool in the sense that some scientists may be
happy to make their own research tools in the lab, while others may prefer to purchase a
standardized tool (or expert assistance in performing a standard method) from a commercial
supplier.
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The desire to make commercial profits from dual-purpose inventions will
also tend to induce patenting by industry researcher innovators. The result
may be paradoxical: patenting dual-purpose research tools for commercial
sale also forces industry scientists to disclose them and precludes secret use
in an industry lab. In general, the industry research context is less
conducive to sharing norms than academia because exclusivity is too easy.
Because industry laboratories are closed to outsiders and many industry
scientists are not required to publish in scientific journals, the costs of
maintaining exclusive use of a research tool may be quite low. This means
that the net benefit of exclusivity, E, will tend to be large for industry
scientists. Even more problematic for sharing norms in the industry context
is the difficulty of enforcement. Enforcing a sharing norm against an
industry scientist who uses a newly invented research tool or method
secretly and exclusively in his or her own laboratory would be nearly
impossible.
By patenting dual-purpose research tools, industry scientists forfeit one
of their most effective and inexpensive mechanisms of maintaining
exclusive use of research tools they invent-secrecy.
If a patented
invention is a do-it-yourself tool, keeping other scientists from using it once
it is patented requires costly litigation (or at least a credible threat of
litigation), reducing the net benefits of exclusivity, E. Commercial
patentees of dual-purpose research tools may. thus also prefer to ignore
infringing use of those innovations in research.
An "ignore patents in research use" norm has the potential to unite
academic and commercial researchers into a single tool-sharing
community-at least for dual-purpose do-it-yourself research tools-if it
can be enforced. While the mechanisms for enforcing a norm of ignoring
patents against an industry scientist are not as powerful as those available to
enforce sharing within the academic research community-industry
scientists rely far less on scientific reputation, publication, and often not at
all on peer-reviewed funding mechanisms-the academic research
community is often far from powerless. Industry scientists have many of
the same preferences for participation in research that academic scientists
do. They often rely on academic scientists for informal scientific
discussions and even for collaboration. Perhaps most importantly, industry
research departments rely extensively on their relationships with academic
scientists in recruiting and hiring staff. In some cases, academic researchers
also have some ability to affect a company's public reputation.
Empirical evidence suggests that an ignore patents norm is reasonably
well-established even across the academic-industry boundary, just as this
analysis would predict. 70

Instead of the feared anticommons and "patent

thicket" situation for do-it-yourself research tools, a norm of "ignoring
patents" seems to have replaced the norm of sharing tools and not patenting.
University scientists are widely known to ignore patent rights routinely.
70. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324-28.
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Only five percent of university scientists in a recent survey study by John P.

Walsh, Charlene Cho, and Wesley M. Cohen even bother to check for
patents that might cover their research activities 7 1 despite the fact that
twenty-two percent have been advised by their institutions that they should
take steps to avoid patent infringement. 72 Patents deter very few scientists
from making research tools "in house." 73 Despite widely publicized legal
74
decisions sharply restraining the scope of any legal "research exemption," 75
scientists routinely believe themselves protected by such an exemption.
They believe that they should not have to pay royalties for tools that they
can make in their laboratories 76 and that high commercial prices for
research inputs justify resorting to do-it-yourself solutions. 77 They may
even purchase patented materials from unlicensed suppliers. 7 8 Universities
refrain from asserting patents against each other under a norm of "academic
use" 79 and sometimes ignore letters notifying them of the potential need to
take a patent license. 80 In at least one documented case, a community of
academic researchers actively advocated ignoring a research tool patent as a
result of what members deemed unreasonable
demands from DuPont, the
81
exclusive licensee of the oncomouse patent.
Consistent with the limited importance afforded to patents by scientists,
Walsh, Cho, and Cohen found that only one percent of academics reported
more than a one-month research delay to obtain patent licenses and none of
the academic respondents had abandoned a study as a result of problems
acquiring such licenses. 82 Moreover, though the sample size for the
question was small, only one of seventeen industrial researchers reported
abandoning a project because of inability to license necessary research tool
83
patents.
The norm of ignoring patents on research tools does not seem to be
simply a matter of difficulty of enforcement, at least with regard to
academic use. Academic laboratories are relatively accessible and have
many visitors. More to the point, industry tool patentees and academic
71. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 15.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Id. at 26-27.
74. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding
university research ineligible for the experimental-use exemption because it "unmistakably
further[s] the institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects"); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv.
Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("While [the] SEC tries to cloak these
tests in the guise of scientific inquiry, that alone cannot immunize its acts.").
75. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 6;
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324-28.
76. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 324.
77. Id. at 324-28.
78. Id. at 325.
79. Id. at 327.
80. Id. at317.
81. Murray, supra note 22, at 27.
82. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 2.
83. Id. at 36.
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scientists agree that academics are known to infringe and yet are left
alone. 84 Firms avoid suing nonprofit institutions for infringement in part
because of the paucity of damages available, but also because they
anticipate negative publicity and community sanctions if they sue, and
because they believe that they will benefit from academic research, which
advances knowledge relevant to their patent portfolios. 85 Moreover, one

result of the increasing overlap of university and industry research is that
industry scientists increasingly depend on their interactions with academic
scientists to advance their own research agendas and are86 thus susceptible to
shunning if they appear to have violated sharing norms.
There is also evidence that the norm of ignoring research tool patents
extends to research use by industry scientists. 8 7 Industry scientists also
report that they sometimes ignore patents on research tools. 8 8 Though they
are much more likely than academics to check for patents and somewhat
more likely to report that patents prevent them from making tools inhouse, 89 only one out of seventeen industry researchers surveyed by Walsh,
Cho, and Cohen reported having stopped a project because of a research
tool patent. In an earlier survey, respondents noted that infringement of
research tool patents by firms is "pervasive" and that people infringed "all
over the place;" 90 that "scientists are not telling their patent counsel" about
potential infringement; 9 1 and that there is a sense that fighting over
intellectual property rights can wait until someone has achieved a valuable
research result. 92 Industry scientists also sometimes invoke a "research
exemption" based on whether the patent covers the product resulting from
the research, 93 and
firms wait to assert their patents until there is a
"valuable" result. 94 Of course the tendency for industry scientists to ignore
patents on do-it-yourself research tools is also consistent with the
difficulties that patentees would have in detecting infringement in industry
laboratories.
The distinction between commercial and research tool use of patented
inventions anticipated by the sharing norm analysis is also evident in

84. Id. at 37; Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 317, 324-

28.
85. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE
DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 63 (1997) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT]; Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 8, at 325.
86. Murray, supra note 22, at 27; Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra
note 8, at 325.
87. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 8, at 327-28.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 36.
Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents,supra note 8, at 309 n.38.
Id. at 327 n.58.
Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
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enforcement practices. 95 Thus, industrial entities believe that it is
reasonable to assert patents against an academic institution when the
institution "becomes a competitor" by, for example, using the patented
invention to perform diagnostic tests. 96
Academic scientists also
distinguish between research and making a profit,9 7 with one noting that he
did not mind not being compensated financially for his invention, "but if
somebody else is earning a large profit on it that seems a little wrong to
me." 9 8
In sum, while the precise contours have not yet been mapped out, it
seems that there is a widespread sharing norm that governs those research
tools and methods that have been patented and can be "homemade" in the
laboratory. While it is likely that research tool patent holders do not
enforce their patents in part because of difficulties in detecting infringement
that takes place in laboratories away from public view, the pervasiveness of
the disregard for patents, its justification in normative terms, the extent to
which widespread infringement is coupled with forbearance from suit, the
distinction between using a tool in research and "making a profit," and the
use of reputational and shunning penalties to enforce forbearance and
sharing suggest that "ignore research tool patents" is a positive social norm
enforced across the communities of academic and industry scientists. It
also seems likely that many patented research tools are dual-purpose
inventions, since both academic and industry scientists have much greater
incentive to patent in the dual-purpose case.
2. Dual-Purpose Research Tools and Materials Sharing
The implications of dual-purpose inventions for research tool sharing
norms are more complex where the transfer of materials, extensive datasets,
or tacit knowledge is necessary in order for others to use a research tool
innovation (and also presumably needed for others to commercialize the
invention). In these cases, exclusivity arises naturally from the need for
materials transfer or face-to-face knowledge transmission.
One likely consequence of having commercial as well as research uses
for a material is that a commercial supplier will offer it for sale on the
market. When materials developed by researchers are made widely
available for commercial purchase because they have nonresearch markets,
the need for direct sharing between researchers is lessened. In essence, the
99
commercial market provides a mechanism for centralized distribution.
However, a true sharing practice (usually the optimal result from the
95. Id. at 326-28; see also WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS,
supra note 8, at 17.
96. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 326-27.
97. Id. at 327 n.57.
98. Gerard George et al., Academics or Entrepreneurs? Entrepreneurial Identity and
Invention Disclosure Behavior of University Scientists 14 (Sept. 6, 2005) (unpublished
paper, on file with the Fordham Law Review), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=799277.
99. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents, supra note 8, at 321-22.
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perspective of the research use of the material) would mandate transfer at
the lowest possible cost. A commercial seller, on the other hand, tries to
obtain the highest price. A research material may be covered by patents,
which provide exclusivity, but even if it is not, the need for standardization
or difficulty in reverse engineering the materials may dictate that scientists
obtain the material from a single source. A supplier who has exclusive
access to a material thus may be able to command a high price.
The benefits of purchasing from a commercial supplier, who provides
uniform quality, simplified transactions, reduced costs of production, and so
forth, may outweigh any exclusivity "tax" the supplier imposes. But in
many situations, the price charged by an exclusive commercial supplier of a
dual-purpose research tool will exceed the cost of supplying the materials
for research use. In some cases, large additional investments must be made
(and recouped) by the supplier to turn the invention from a research tool
into a commercial product, raising the price as a result of improvements that
are unnecessary from a research perspective. For example, expensive
clinical testing might be necessary to satisfy regulatory requirements, but
unnecessary to use the invention in some kinds of research.
Here again, as for do-it-yourself dual-purpose research tools, the trick to
promoting a sharing norm among scientists is to separate the exclusivity
premium for the commercial market from the exclusivity premium for
research by finding a mechanism to disseminate the tool to researchers at
cost while maintaining profits for commercial uses.10 0 Commercializing
user-developed research materials necessarily involves some type of direct
transaction between a researcher innovator and a commercial supplier. That
transaction may involve the transfer of patent rights, materials, data, or
trade secret know-how. (If no direct transaction is needed, then there is no
reason to anticipate that commercial supply will be exclusive and hence no
concern about pricing above marginal cost.) The transfer from a researcher
innovator to a commercial supplier provides a pressure point at which the
norms of the scientific community can be enforced. For example, a sharing
norm might require that academic researcher innovators transfer inventions
for commercialization only under licenses that provide generous discounts
for researchers. Alternatively, the license might permit face-to-face or
centralized sharing mechanisms within the scientific community to continue
to operate despite commercial exclusive sales.
In fact, "norm

100. University researchers often do get substantial discounts on research materials.
Sometimes these discounts have little to do with sharing norms among scientists.
Commercial suppliers may be motivated to offer discounts on their own initiative as a form
of price discrimination, given that academic scientists may have limited ability to pay.
Commercial suppliers may also be susceptible to reputational penalties. Those for whom
scientists are important customers can be susceptible to a "boycott" approach. Some areas of
research are so important to public health or some other public concern that the public at
large may protest a failure to provide research discounts. These factors may lead to
academic discounts for manufacturer-developed tools.
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entrepreneurs" within the academic community are advocating exactly this
kind of approach. 10 1
While the "ignore patents" norm seems to function effectively even
across the academic-industry boundary for do-it-yourself research tools, the
evidence suggests that there are particular difficulties with sharing materials
across the industry-academic boundary. 102 Besides sometimes failing to
receive materials requested from industry suppliers, academic scientists
complained of requests for onerous terms of transfer, such as reach-through
royalties and publication restrictions. 0 3 Because empirical studies have not
generally distinguished between dual-purpose and other research tools, it is
not clear how often these difficulties in sharing materials across the
academic-industry boundary are related to concerns about protecting
commercial applications of dual-purpose research tools and how often they
are due instead primarily to a mismatch of sharing preferences between
academic and industry scientists as discussed in the next section.
Industry scientists are not generally permitted to avail themselves of
mechanisms that give academics access to research materials, such as
research discounts or centralized material depositories, which are generally
limited to use in nonprofit research. One reason for the limitations may be
that it is more difficult in these cases to ensure a separation between
research use and commercial exploitation. There may be concern that a
dual-purpose research material transferred to an industry scientist at
nominal cost will be used for commercial purposes beyond research. In
fact, in some cases, such as those involving physicians who wear both
researcher and clinician hats, even academic discounts pose difficult linedrawing problems and blur the boundary between commercial and research
use. 104
Patenting is in principle a means to diminish some of the potential for
leakage from research use to commercial exploitation because patents can
be used to enforce restrictions to research use only. This paradoxical role of
patents may explain, in part, the finding by Walsh, Cho, and Cohen that the
friction involved in sharing research materials is not increased by patenting.
The remaining difficulties in sharing research materials across the
academic-industry boundary suggest, however, that worries about mixing
commercial and research uses of dual-purpose materials may continue to
depress the potential for sharing of research materials between industry and
academic scientists.

101. See supra note 100.
102. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 25,
35-36; Murray, supra note 22, at 25.
103. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 23-25,
35. When materials were transferred to academic scientists, however, up-front fees were

rare and almost never more than $1000.

104. David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Ziedonis, Academic Patents and Materials Transfer
Agreements: Substitutes or Complements?, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 157 (2007).
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The arguments in this section are summarized in Table I. To evaluate
the relationship between dual-purpose research tools and sharing practices
further, it would be helpful to know how many research tool patents are
actually patents on dual-purpose innovations, the extent to which
difficulties with sharing materials arise in the dual-purpose context, and so
forth.
B. The Implications of OverlappingAcademic and Commercial Research
Communities
Besides the role played by dual-purpose inventions, the other major
ramification of research in Pasteur's Quadrant is that the relevant research
community no longer consists only of academic scientists. In the Walsh,
Cho, and Cohen study, thirty percent of academic respondents had ties to
small businesses and twenty percent to large firms. 10 5 Industry scientists
often collaborate with large numbers of academic scientists as well.
Because industry scientists have a different typical preference profile from
academic researchers and work in a very different environment, it is more
difficult to stabilize and enforce norms of sharing in a community
consisting of both academic and industry scientists than in a more
homogeneous academic research community. The question thus arises to
what extent research tool sharing norms can survive in a mixed scientific
community. Furthermore, the social benefits of research tool sharing are
less clear when industry scientists are involved since they are more likely to
keep their research results secret. Thus, there is a question to what extent
policy should aim to promote sharing academic research tool innovations
with industry scientists as opposed to simply maintaining sharing practices
between academics.
1. Differences Between Industry and Academic Scientists
Typical differences between academic and industry scientists can be
incorporated into the social norm model discussed earlier by adjusting the
parameter values. Unlike academic researchers, who report scientific
competition and sharing costs as the major impediments to sharing
materials, industry researchers report protecting commercial value and
inability to obtain desired licensing terms (probably also related to
commercial competitiveness) as by far the most important reasons not to
share. 10 6 Industry scientists will generally have a greater ability to benefit
from exclusive use of a tool or method, (higher E in the model) in part
because, at least outside of the dual-purpose invention context, they can
more easily keep tools or methods secret while using them within their
laboratories and in part because they may be able to obtain greater exclusive
benefits from their research results. Also, since they work for entities

105. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 11.

106. Id. at 55 fig.2.
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motivated primarily by the potential for commercial gain, rather than by the
intrinsic pursuit of knowledge, they are less able to benefit from the success
of the research enterprise as a whole than academic scientists (lower U in
the model). For similar reasons, industry scientists may obtain smaller
rewards for sharing their research tool innovations through publication or
otherwise (lower R). This means that a group of industry scientists is
generally less likely than a group of academic scientists to be in regimes I
or II of the model where sharing is optimal.
Nonetheless, the user innovation analysis suggests that sharing will be
preferable even among industry research entities in some circumstances,
just as it has sometimes been in other commercial settings. For example,
players in the biotechnology "industry"--or at least certain parts of itmight value the overall success of the industry in its competition with other
approaches to medical, agricultural, and other life science-related
technological problems more than they value exclusive use of a research
tool. Earlier studies of information sharing among commercial entities
suggest that sharing is most likely to be preferred during a period in which
the situation for many
an industry is being established' 07-certainly
research-intensive science-based commercial entities. Commercial entities
may also find it worthwhile to cooperate in producing certain platform
tools, while competing to produce results using them. Commercial support
for open source software is of this ilk.
Even if sharing at least some tools and methods would be preferable for
industry researchers, however, they may have difficulty overcoming the
collective action problems of Regime 1I with social norms because it is
difficult to enforce a sharing norm for research tools in the industry
environment, where trade secrecy is generally feasible (so that it is hard to
detect failures to share) and where scientists may not have the repeated
interactions and relationships that facilitate community-imposed sanctions.
Industry groups that have developed sharing norms historically seemingly
have relied on personal relationships, opening their facilities to visits from
competitors, movement of personnel within the industry, and publications
to develop the means to enforce them. 0 8g When industry scientists publish
their methods, discuss them at conferences, or share them with trusted
friends at other companies, this is evidence of the kinds of relationships that
might support a sharing norm. Occasional publication is not a guaranteed
means of detecting failures to share, however, since it is difficult to assess
what a firm might be holding back.
While it may be possible in some arenas to develop informal sharing
arrangements across the academic-industry interface, there are significant
107. Meyer, supra note 4, at 15-17.
108. Id. at 2-3; see also NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci., NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G, INST. OF MED.,
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2003 FEDERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
BUDGET (2002); Arti K. Rai, "Open and Collaborative" Research: A New Model for
Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INFRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 131, 131-59 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005).
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barriers to doing so: industry scientists are likely to be both more motivated
and more able to defect from sharing norms than academics. The situation
for an overlapping community of industry and academic researchers
engaged in Pasteur's Quadrant research is thus quite complicated. If a
sharing norm would be viable in each community separately, a combined
community would probably also prefer to share, but even in such cases
mechanisms for sharing and for enforcing sharing norms will have to be
adapted to a more heterogeneous group. Except when dual-purpose
innovations are involved, the closed industry context means that there is no
guarantee that a sharing practice can be established. Industry scientists will
often be able to defect with impunity by simply keeping their tool
innovations secret and will not be able to commit credibly to a sharing
practice. Moreover, the fact that industry scientists may want exclusive
rights over their research results may make sharing research tools with them
less attractive to academics.
Nonetheless, even if sharing across the academic-industry boundary is
difficult, there is no reason to assume that the overlap of industry and
academic research will lead inexorably to a breakdown of sharing norms
among academics. Sharing norms that existed among academic scientists
during a period when there was less overlap between academic and industry
research reflected the preferences of academic scientists, as we have
discussed. Unless the overlap between research agendas radically affects
those preferences themselves, the academic science community can be
expected to "defend" its research tool commons. If, as may well be the
case, sharing is preferred by academics but not by industry scientists, or if a
joint sharing norm cannot be enforced, academics can adopt a different type
of tactic. Rather than attempt to maintain a joint practice of sharing
research tools and materials with industry scientists, academic scientists
may attempt to "police the boundaries" of their research tools commons by
sharing with other academics and not with industry scientists.
If academics can do this effectively, academic and industry research
entities can then engage in tit-for-tat exchange or market transactions across
the boundary between their communities. Paradoxically, then, an academic
research tool commons that excludes industry researchers might actually
increase the total amount of research tool sharing since industry researchers
will have to cough up something (either money or access to their own
innovative tools) in exchange for access to academic research tool
innovations. As we saw in the dual-purpose context, accommodating the
need to exchange research tools, methods, and materials with "outsiders"
may require adapting sharing mechanisms within the academic community.
New opportunities for academics to defect from sharing norms by making
side deals with industry players may also have to be taken into account in
norm enforcement practices in Pasteur's Quadrant. Increased academic
intention to conflict of interest policies is one way to deal with this
problem.
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Critical factors in determining what will happen when academic and
industry research streams merge are whether or not each group of
researchers can control the other group's access to the tools it has developed
and whether each group has means of detecting and penalizing defections
from its norms. These factors operate differently depending on whether one
focuses on do-it-yourself tools and methods or on materials, data, and tacit
knowledge.
2. Sharing Norms for Do-It-Yourself Research Tools in Pasteur's Quadrant
In academic science, as discussed, do-it-yourself research tools and
methods are traditionally shared by publication. Within the academic
research community, a norm of sharing through publication can be enforced
because the community enjoys considerable control over the allocation of
research funds and reputation through peer review and so forth, and
university labs are open enough that violations of the norm are reasonably
likely to be detected if a tool is not disclosed within a reasonable period of
time. Control of these resources can be used to penalize noncompliance
with the sharing norm.
Given this open publication model, however, the academic community
has relatively weak mechanisms for controlling the access of industry
scientists to published do-it-yourself tools and methods. Industry scientists
may not depend strongly on public funding 0 9 and may have little
sensitivity to reputation penalties imposed by the academic community.
And, as already discussed, unless industry scientists are independently
motivated to patent their tools and methods (as they would be for dualpurpose inventions), it would be difficult to monitor whether industrial
researchers are complying with a sharing norm by publishing their own
tools and methods. A likely outcome of the merging of academic and
industrial research streams is that industry researchers make free use of doit-yourself tools and methods developed by academic researchers while
keeping their own tool innovations to themselves.
This may or may not be a problem from a social perspective. After all,
technology transfer is all about making academic inventions, funded with
public money, available for commercial purposes. 110 From the perspective
of the academic research community, however, academic scientists'
inability to trade their tool inventions for access to tools invented by
industry scientists raises a kind of reverse technology transfer problem.
Academics would like to gain access to research tools developed by
industry scientists and would therefore prefer to use their own research tool

109. 1 say "may" here because some industry scientists do rely significantly on public
funding, though the scientific community may not control that funding through peer review.
110. MOWERY ET AL., supra note 63, at 1; Joel West & Scott Gallagher, Patternsof Open
Innovation in Open Source Software, in OPEN

82 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2006).
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inventions as "bargaining chips" for this purpose, while maintaining a
sharing norm among academics.
Patenting is one means to try to distinguish industry and academic
research use-just as patents can be used to distinguish between research
use and other commercial use. Enforcement of patents on do-it-yourself
research tools and methods against industry scientists working in closed
laboratories is likely to be ineffective, however. Industry scientists are
likely to be able to "free ride" on academic do-it-yourself research tool
inventions with impunity-and without disclosing their own research tool
innovations.
Interestingly, academic-industry collaboration, which may be worrisome
in light of its potential effects on the direction of academic research, II may
increase the potential for sharing between academic and industry scientists
because it gives the academic community leverage to impose reputational
and shunning penalties on industry researchers, and gives academic
researchers greater ability to "monitor" industry sharing of tools -and
methods. It is very difficult to assess the functioning of industry-academic
sharing norms for do-it-yourself research tools, since, outside of the context
of dual-purpose research tools, it is hard to know what fraction of industrydeveloped tools are patented, published, or otherwise disclosed so as to
make them publicly known. The analysis in this section is summarized in
Table III.
3. Materials Transfer in Pasteur's Quadrant
Where dissemination of research tools and methods requires not only
publication, but also the transfer of materials, data, or tacit knowledge, the
situation is somewhat different. In this kind of situation, though industry
scientists can continfue to keep their own tools secret, they cannot simply
free ride off of academic sharing norms. Moreover, sharing with industry
scientists becomes more costly to academic researcher innovators, who are
likely to be unwilling to share without receiving something in return. Thus,
while the need for materials transfer complicates the establishment of
sharing norms between academics because it increases the cost of sharing
(and thus may undermine sharing norms), the natural exclusivity available
in this situation may help to facilitate either the enforcement of sharing
norms across academic-industry boundaries or at least the development of a

111. Henry Etzkowitz, The Evolution of the Entrepreneurial University, 1 INT'L J. TECH.
& GLOBALISATION 64 (2004); Tomas Hellstr6m & Merle Jacob, Emerging Issues in R&D
Evaluation: The Case of University-Industry PartnershipNetworks, in THE FUTURE OF
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE ACADEMY 95 (Merle Jacob & Tomas Hellstrom eds.,
2000); Merle Jacob & Tomas Hellstr6m, From Networking Researchers to the Networked
University, in THE FUTURE OF KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION IN THE ACADEMY, supra, at 81;
James Stuart, Comment, The Academic-IndustrialComplex: A Warning to Universities, 75

U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2004); Waverly Ding, Does Science Chase Money?-The Impact of
Industry Research on the Selection of Research Topics Among Academic Scientists (n.d.)
(unpublished study, on file with the Fordham Law Review).

2009]

USER INNO VA TOR COMMUNITY NORMS

2265

barter or market mechanism for exchanging research tools between industry
and academic scientists.
When academic scientists take measures to reduce the costs of sharing by
developing collective materials depositories, for example, they often
confine access to those repositories to academics. 112 The first-best option
from a social perspective might be for both academic and industry scientists
to participate in a joint materials depository. However, it is difficult for an
industry scientist to make a credible commitment to contribute to the
depository because industry secrecy makes it difficult to tell whether she is
actually contributing her innovative materials. Even if these enforcement
problems could be solved by monitoring and balancing contributions and
use of materials, the preference differences and difficulties in enforcing
sharing between academic and industry scientists may still preclude a viable
joint pool of research materials. A more feasible second-best option may
therefore be a pool of research materials restricted to academics
supplemented by individual tit-for-tat or market exchanges with industry
scientists.
Table IV summarizes this analysis. Given this analysis, the need to rely
on individually negotiated transactions rather than informal norms might be
expected to lead to friction at the boundary between the academic and
industry scientific communities. Indeed, these are the most problematic
transfers. Where a formal material transfer was involved, sixty percent of
transfers from academia to industry took more than one month to negotiate,3
compared to forty-five percent of transfers from industry to industry;"1
while thirty-five percent of transfers from industry to academia took more
than one month to negotiate, compared to twenty-one percent of transfers
between academic institutions. 114 Moreover, while attempts to standardize
a formal material transfer agreement with minimal restrictions have been
moderately successful in the academic context (many institutions use the
Uniform Biological Materials Transfer Agreement), attempts to develop a
minimally restrictive uniform agreement to cover material transfers from
industry to academia have failed.1 1 5 It is difficult to know, however,
whether the friction at the academic-industry boundary is part of a healthy
defense of an academic research tool commons or merely a symptom of
norm failure.

112. SCOTT STERN, BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS:
SCIENCES passim (2004) (detailing the history, impact,

KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE

and future of biological resource

centers).
113. WALSH ET AL., PATENTS, MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS, supra note 8, at 35-36.

114. Id. at25.
115. Eliot Marshall, Need a Reagent? Just Sign Here..., 278 SCIENCE 212, 213 (1997);
Mowery & Ziedonis, supra note 104, at 161.
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III. THE POTENTIAL TO PROMOTE SHARING IN PASTEUR'S QUADRANT
THROUGH LAW AND POLICY

Tables I through IV in the Appendix attempt to summarize the analysis
presented in this essay. Three primary factors determine the feasibility of
sharing norms and practices for user-developed research tools: (1) the
divergent preferences of academic and industry scientists, which determine
whether sharing is preferred by scientists themselves; (2) the differences in
potential for exclusivity and cost of sharing between do-it-yourself research
tools and tools that require face-to-face transactions such as research
materials; and (3) the distinction between garden variety research tools and
dual-purpose research tools that have significant commercial markets
outside of the research context. In this part, I rely on the above analysis to
consider whether policy measures can promote wider sharing of research
tools and materials in Pasteur's Quadrant.
A. Promotinga Do-It-YourselfResearch Tool Commons
In Pasteur's Quadrant, do-it-yourself tools are likely to be widely shared,
with the exception of garden variety research tools developed by industry
scientists, which can be kept secret. Academics will share do-it-yourself
tools with each other and, unavoidably, with industry scientists through the
traditional mechanism of publication. They may use patents to restrict the
commercial exploitation of dual-purpose do-it-yourself tools, but are
unlikely to employ patents against other researchers because they value
shared access to tools developed by others. Industry scientists will
necessarily disclose their dual-purpose research tools if they patent them, as
they will try to do in order to exploit the nonresearch commercial market.
While they could in principle seek to enforce those patents against other
researchers, they are unlikely to do so (as evidenced by the "ignore patents"
norm) because of the difficulty of enforcement in comparison to the
benefits of a norm of sharing for research use.
A widespread norm of sharing do-it-yourself research tools is thus to be
expected, and the failure of empirical studies to find problems with
patenting of research tools per se is understandable in this framework.
However, the benefits of sharing research tool innovations are unlikely to
induce industry scientists to share their garden variety research tools, which
they can use secretly in their laboratories. There is little that can be done to
induce industry scientists to share such tools since academics have no way
to prevent industry scientists from using the research tools that academics
develop and publish.
If, as it seems, the "ignore patents" norm is already functioning to permit
sharing in the do-it-yourself research tool context except when industry
scientists can keep their research tools secret, one approach is to let well
enough alone. There are several reasons that we might want to do more to
encourage research tool sharing, however, by codifying the "ignore patents"
norm in a legally enforced research use exemption from patent infringement
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and by discouraging academics from patenting garden variety do-it-yourself
research tools. First, sharing of research tools leads to faster research
progress, which has social benefits over and above its payoffs to researchers
themselves. Exclusive use of research tools has little if any public benefit.
Thus, society may want to promote sharing even when scientists themselves
prefer exclusivity. While the "ignore patents" norm suggests that scientists
generally do prefer to share do-it-yourself tools, a research use exemption
would stabilize the norm in marginal cases and against defectors. 116
Moreover, the norm could erode in the future. Even though patents
facilitate the separation of commercial and research exclusivity,
commercialization of dual-purpose innovations by academic scientists has
the potential to lessen that community's ability to impose penalties on
defectors from the sharing norms. Academic scientists' preferences for
doing research might change through their involvement in commercializing
a dual-purpose invention, for example, or, perhaps more importantly, the
availability of alternative sources of both financial and psychological
income might decrease the force of reputational penalties from the
community on those scientists who invent dual-purpose research tools.
Policy initiatives by research funders and by norm entrepreneurs within
the research community can also bolster the norm of not enforcing patents
against research users of dual-purpose research tools. For example, the
recent White Paper, In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in
Licensing University Technology, signed by a number of universities,
advocates a distinction between licensing for sale and licensing for use,
proposing that "[a]bsent the need for a significant investment-such as to
optimize a technology for wide use-broad, non-exclusive licensing of
tools ...can help maximize the benefits."' 117 Further, the White Paper
states that "drafting of [an] exclusive grant could make it clear that the
license is exclusive for the sale, but not use, of such products."' 18 As the
White Paper points out, "in [drafting a license which is exclusive only for
sale], the university ensures that it is free to license non-exclusively to
others the right (or may simply not assert its rights) to use the patented
technology, which [researchers] may do either using products purchased
from the exclusive licensee or those that they make in-house for their own
use." 119 More initiatives of this sort, including perhaps making research
funding contingent on research use exemptions in licenses, 120 would be
desirable to strengthen research use sharing norms against possible

116. See Strandburg, supra note 3, for a discussion of the effects of a research-use
exemption on tool suppliers.
117. ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO
CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 3 (2007), available at http://news-

service.stanford.edu/news/2007/march7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Rai, Regulating Scientific Research, supra note 9, at 147.
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temptations to defect. Licensing practices play an even more important role
in promoting sharing of research materials, to which we now turn.
B. The More ComplicatedArena of Material Transfer
Research materials have higher sharing costs and lower costs to enforce
exclusivity, so on balance they are less likely to be shared. However, in the
academic context, at least, norms of materials sharing remain relatively
strong, and there are steps that can be taken, primarily by reducing the costs
of sharing materials, to strengthen those norms. These steps include
establishing centralized materials depositories, establishing a norm that
dual-purpose research tool licenses include academic research discounts or
rights to distribute the materials through research depositories, and
standardized nonrestrictive terms for materials transfer agreements. 1 2 1
Assuming that some or all of these mechanisms to enhance the viability
of academic research materials sharing norms are adopted, the question
raised by the analysis in Part II.B is to what extent such initiatives to
promote sharing can and should be extended to industry scientists. There
are two distinct strategies one might adopt for optimizing sharing in
Pasteur's Quadrant: one approach is to attempt to encompass both industry
and academic scientists within a single materials sharing community. An
alternative is to exclude industry scientists from an academic research
materials commons so that they cannot free ride off of academic sharing
norms, but must exchange something-such as access to their own research
materials-for access to the academic materials commons.
Where industry scientists can keep their own innovations secret-as they
can for garden variety research tools-a joint sharing approach is unlikely
to work. There might be some situations in which it is possible to monitor
industry contributions to and withdrawals from a jointly accessible
materials depository or other research tool commons so as to ensure a
proper balance over time. In most cases, however, it will probably be too
easy for industry participants to game the system and hold back their most
important innovations. For the most part, then, the best approach to garden
variety research materials is probably for academic scientists to engage in
tit-for-tat or market transactions with industry scientists seeking access to
their research material innovations.
To do this, academic researchers must have something to exchange,
which means that, if there is to be a research tool and material commons for
academic researchers, it must be limited to academic researchers so that the
tools and materials can be used as currency of exchange with outsiders. It
is thus interesting to note that most of the mechanisms for enforcing
materials sharing within the academic community do reserve access to
members of that community.
Licensing terms with noncommercial
research exemptions, noncommercial materials repositories, and so forth

12 1. Strandburg, supra note 7 (manuscript at 1).
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reduce the advantages to academics of defecting, while at the same time
restricting the advantages of common access to noncommercial researchers.
Norm entrepreneurship within the academic community aimed at presenting
a united front in dealing with industry also serves both ends. 122 For
example, the "Nine Points" issued recently by a group of universities and
discussed above urges universities to negotiate all licenses, even those
involving industry, so as to reserve rights for all nonprofit organizations "to
transfer tangible research materials.., to others in the non-profit and
governmental sectors." 123 Research funding agencies could promote
similar policies.
The situation might be different for dual-purpose research tools. The
usual concern about industry scientists-that they will use tools from a
research commons while keeping their own tools secret-is ameliorated for
dual-purpose tools, which are likely to be exploited commercially and
hence disclosed. Industry scientists could thus feasibly participate in a joint
depository for dual-purpose research materials as long as they commit to
making their own commercially available or patented materials available to
other researchers through the depository. On the other hand, industry
scientists will often keep their research results secret, which may or may
not provide reason to exclude them from a research tool commons. (The
propensity to keep research results secret reduces the social spillovers from
making research tools more widely available.)
CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this essay is necessarily somewhat abstract, in
part because empirical studies have only recently begun to focus on the
distinction between do-it-yourself research tools and materials and
generally have not yet focused on the distinction between dual-purpose and
garden variety research tools. More empirical information about how
sharing practices depend on these distinctions and about the industry and
academic preferences that determine the parameters in our model would be
valuable for refining both the analysis and the proposals here.
A few summary comments are nonetheless in order. First, the analysis of
preferences and social norms points out that scientific interest in the same
research questions does not immediately transform industry and academic
researchers into one scientific community. Different preference structures
and relationship patterns may support separate community norms and
Second, because academic
practices despite overlapping research.
researchers are more likely both to prefer and to be able to maintain sharing
norms, the possibilities for beneficial sharing norms and practices may
somewhat paradoxically depend on maintaining separate preference
structures and norms in industry and academia even when there are
overlapping research interests. This observation may have implications for
122. Murray, supra note 22, at 36.
123. ASS'N OF AM. MED. COLLS. ET AL., supra note 117, at 2.
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university policies regarding faculty entrepreneurship and conflicts of
interest.
Finally, this analysis should encourage efforts to find ways to make
research tool sharing more attractive and less costly to both groups.
Scientific journals are a particularly promising point of contact between
academic researchers and those industry researchers who benefit from the
overall advancement of a particular field. While it is probably not possible
to reduce the private commercial benefits of exclusivity, mechanisms for
reducing the cost of materials transfer both enhance the benefits of sharing
for the entire group and reduce individual incentives to defect, making it
more likely that both industry and academic scientists will be willing to
participate in broad-based research tool sharing.
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APPENDIX 124

Table I: Dual-PurposeResearch Tools & Do-It-Yourself Transfers

Transfer

Dual-Purpose Research Tools
(Disclosure needed for commercial exploitation by both industry
and academic scientists so secrecy is not an option; patenting is
likely for commercial exploitation)
Likely Community
Preference

A +-+A

A

A
I

Share:
high; E low

Probably share:
E low for both; U
U
both;ms
for academics
higer
higher for

Viabinitgof
Sharing
Norm/Practice

Policy
Recommendation

High:
Traditional
communalism

None

Medium:
Hard to detect
industr
infringement;
penalties
reputationsuing
for

Research use
exemption

academics; ignore
patents norm

S

Probably share:
E low due to
on
enforcing patents on
enfodifficultyenf
DIY research use; U
may not be high

High:
Hard to detect
research tool
DIY
of
infringement
pat
patents

Research use
exmto
exemption

124. In the tables included in this appendix, "A" stands for academic scientist, and "I"
stands for industry scientist. An extended discussion of sharing between academics (A
A) may be found in Strandburg, supra note 7.
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Table H." Dual-PurposeResearch Tools & Materials Transfers

Transfer

Dual-Purpose Research Tools
(Disclosure needed for commercial exploitation by both industry
and academic scientists so seciecy is not an option; patenting is
likely for commercial exploitation)
Likely Community
Preference
Share if costs can
be decreased:
U high; E low if can

A

-

A

Viability of
Sharing
Norm/Practice

Medium:
Depends on

separate commercial

mechanisms to

and research
exclusivity;
C can be
high

bring sharing costs
down

Policy
Recommendation
Research use
exemption;
UBMTA; 125
depositories;
cecial
licensing
with
research-friendly
terms

Possibly share:
E higher for industry;
U higher for
academics; concerns

I - I-A
A

--

I

commercial
and
about separating
research use, but
patents mitigate;
concerns
indsrsecof about
industry secrecy of

Medium:
Different academic
and industry

Research
exemption; reduce
sharing costs (e.g.,

peeecsmy
preferences may
undermine sharing
norms; decreasing
costs of sharing
would help

UMAlk
UBMTA-like
terms; joint
depositories with
strict requirements
for contributions)

research results
Possibly share:
E may be high;
concerns about
separating
commercial and
research use, but
patents mitigate; U
may be low
depending on state of
nd stae

Low to medium:
In many cases
preferences will be
not to share (E too
high, U too low);
idut may
inusry
prefer a shared
platform of tools
with which to
i t
compete

Research
exemption;
reducing sharing
costs may help;
need to consider
antitrust issues

125. "UBMTA" stands for the Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement.
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Table II. Garden Variety Research Tools & Do-It-Yourself Transfers

Transfer

Garden Variety Research Tools
(Industry scientists may use these secretly)
Likely Community
Viability of
Policy
Preference
Sharing
Recommendation
Norm/Practice

Sha E low
U high;

High:
Traditional
communalism

A prefers to share,
but I may not:
E low for academics
and high for
industry scientists;
U high for

Mixed:
Academics will
share through
publication;
industry can ee
ride on academic
disclosure without

Share:
A

+-

A

A
I- A
A
I

academics and
lower for industry
scientists

reciprocal
disclosure; limited
ability to restrict
industry use

None

Academics should
not patent;
research use
exemption (only
mpeffective
since industry use
can be secret)

through patents
Probably share:
Eahigh due to
secrecy pssibity;
secrecy possibility;
U may not be high

Low:
Even if sharing is
preferred, no way
to enforce because
of secrecy

None
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Table IV: Garden Variety Research Tools & MaterialsTransfers

Transfer

Garden Variety Research Tools
(Industry scientists may use these secretly)
Likely
Viability of Sharing
Policy
Community
Preference

A

A

Share if costs
decreased:
A high; E low;
U can be high

Norm/Practice

Medium:
Depends on
mechanisms to bring
sharing costs down

Recommendation
No patenting or
ignore patents;
research use
exemption;
UBMTA,
depositories,
commercial
licensing with
research-friendly
terms

I
A

-

-*

A
I

Possibly share:
E high for
industry due to
secrecy; U
higher for
academics;
concerns about
industry
secrecy of
research results

Low:
Different preferences
undermine sharing;
industry secrecy
undermines sharing;
industry cannot free
ride on academic
disclosure because of
need for face-to-face
transactions; market
or barter may be best
approach

Probably not
share:
E may be high;
U may be low
depending on
state of industry

Low:
Preferences often not
to share (E too high,
U too low);
sometimes an
industry may prefer
sharing tools to
compete with
outsiders, but secrecy
permits free riding

Encourage academic
research material
sharing (as above);
joint depositories
with contribution
requirements and
extraction limits
may work in some
cases; UBMTA-like
standard terms with
rights for academic
research

None

